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ABSTRACT 
Today’s ever-increasing amount of data places new demands on 
cognitive ergonomics and requires new design ideas to ensure 
successful human–data interaction. Our aim is to identify the 
cognitive factors that require attention when designing systems 
to improve decision-making based on large amounts of data. We 
designed an experiment that simulates the typical cognitive 
demands people encounter in data analysis situations. We 
demonstrate some essential cognitive limitations using a 
behavioural experiment with 20 participants. The studied task 
presented the participants with critical and noncritical attributes 
that contained information on two groups of people. They had to 
select the response option (group) with a higher frequency of 
critical attributes. The results showed that accuracy of judgement 
decreased as the amount of information increased, and that 
judgement was affected by irrelevant information. Our results 
thus demonstrate critical cognitive limitations when people utilise 
data and suggest a cognitive bias in data-based decision-making. 
Therefore, when designing for cognition, we should consider the 
human cognitive limitations that are manifested in a data analysis 
context and develop general cognitive ergonomics guidelines for 
design to support the utilisation of data and improve data-based 
decision-making. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Human-centered computing~Laboratory experiments   • 
Human-centered computing~Empirical studies in HCI   • Applied 
computing~Psychology 
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1 Introduction 
In this era of digitalisation, humans need to increasingly make 
decisions that rely on data analysed and summarised by 
algorithms and systems. Data-based decision-making may appear 
simple on the surface: systems such as search engines provide the 
most important parts of the data for the experts and laymen 
interacting with the system to enable them to make rational 
decisions based on the evidence presented. However, previous 
research on human engineering and decision-making has already 
demonstrated that human–computer interaction is not always 
effortless and human decisions are prone to errors [1, 2]. The 
cognitive ergonomics approach [3] and findings regarding 
experimental and applied cognitive psychology in human 
cognitive function [4] are essential to ensure successful ‘human-
data’ interaction when designing systems and practices for the 
increasing number of contexts in which people utilise big data.  
Two major limitations need to be considered. First, the amount 
of data has increased and the methods to analyse them have 
advanced considerably in recent years, but the basic cognitive 
ability of human beings has not developed in the same way. On 
one hand, human decision-making is still limited by, for example, 
our capacity to rehearse and process information in short-term 
working memory [5, 6], our inclination to better recall the first 
and last items from serially presented information [7], and the 
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various cognitive tendencies that bias our decisions [8]. On the 
other hand, although the human ability to learn is exceptional, 
developing expert-level knowledge and skills is time-consuming 
[9], and we seldom acquire exceptional or even adequate skill 
levels in a wide range of domains. For example, domain experts 
are rarely experts in data analysis, and they often have little 
knowhow or control of the systems used to analyse and 
summarise their data. 
Second, although advances in computation and data analysis 
make it possible to differentiate complex patterns from large 
heterogeneous data sets, a query may appear fundamentally 
different when parameters or filtering criteria are changed. As a 
result, we live in ‘filter bubbles’ created by information processing 
systems [10], and large parts of important, significant, or novel 
views of the data may remain unnoticed. Therefore, despite the 
availability of huge amounts of data, we are not able to thoroughly 
utilise the information and evidence present in them. Our 
decisions may hence be founded on narrow views that exclude the 
critical factors necessary for making good, informed decisions [2]. 
The aim of this paper is to identify the cognitive factors that 
need attention when designing systems that support decision-
making in contexts in which large data sets are utilised to improve 
evidence-based management [11, 12]. First, the amount of 
information required in everyday decision-making easily exceeds 
the limited capacity of working memory [6]. This cognitive 
limitation constrains how humans represent and rehearse the 
essential features and parameters of the data, and how much of 
this information is used when making decisions and judgements 
[13]. Second, when presenting data, it is seldom possible to 
present all the information simultaneously. Information is 
therefore often presented sequentially in smaller pieces. Research 
shows that the position of information affects encoding and the 
memory of information and decision-making [7, 14, 15]. Third, 
data-based decision-making is also a specific example of a 
demanding judgment task and thus likely to be subject to the 
biases typical to human thinking, such as our tendency to search 
for evidence matching our expectations (confirmation bias) [16], 
and the ‘framing’ of information affecting our choices [7, 15, 17]. 
In our study, we systematically approach these cognitive demands 
and limitations and investigate how the amount of presented 




The participants were 20 volunteers (14 of them female) aged 
between 18 and 49. 
2.2 Material 
A new judgement task was created for the experiment. The stimuli 
consisted of three critical target attributes and three noncritical 
background attributes associated with numbers between 1 and 10, 
which described the level of prevalence of the attribute in Group 
A and Group B. Participants were instructed to determine 
whether Group A or Group B had a higher workload, based on the 
values for the presented critical attributes only. The critical target 
attributes were related to workload and referred to disruptions, 
time pressure, and information overload, whereas the noncritical 
background attributes were neutral or related to the alleviation of 
workload and referred to team work, breaks and learning. The 
stimuli were assembled as sequences including one, two, or three 
critical and noncritical attributes (Figure 1). The sequences 
belonged to either of two ambiguity categories, depending on the 
total accumulated score for the critical target attributes in the 
sequence. In an unambiguous sequence, the total accumulated 
critical attribute in the sequence was greater for either Group A 
or B, that is, it was clear whether Group A or B had a higher 
workload. In an ambiguous sequence, the total accumulated 
critical attribute score was the same for both groups, that is, both 
choices were equally valid. The total accumulated score for the 
background attributes was always unambiguous and thus either 
supported or did not support either Group A or B. Each participant 
had altogether 192 sequences. A detailed description of how the 
ambiguous and unambiguous sequences and stimulus sets were 
constructed is available on request. 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of an ambiguous stimulus sequence with four single stimuli. The actual stimuli were in Finnish. 
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The stimulus sequences were presented to the participants on a 
computer screen. Before each stimulus, a fixation dot was shown 
for 500 ms, after which the stimulus was shown for 3000 ms. After 
the last stimulus in the sequence, the response screen was visible 
until the participant pressed one of the reply keys, indicating 
Group A or B, or for a maximum time of 5000 ms. The participant’s 
selection was highlighted for 500 ms. After this, the process was 
repeated for the next stimulus sequence. 
3 Results 
The independent variables were (i) the amount of presented 
information (length of a stimulus sequence, that is, the number of 
items within a sequence), (ii) the difficulty of the decision-making 
task (unambiguous vs ambiguous stimulus sets), and (iii) the role 
of background information (values for stimulus attributes defined 
as information irrelevant to the task). The dependent variables 
were the mean response time and the percentage of correct 
replies.  
The percentages of correct responses showed that, as the 
amount of information increased, the level of correct responses 
decreased. Furthermore, the level of correct responses was higher 
and the response times were shorter when the noncritical 
background information supported rather than conflicted with the 
correct response based on the critical target information. 
Moreover, the distribution of different response categories 
showed that if the task had no correct reply (ambiguous 
sequences) but the background features supported either of the 
response options (A or B), the participants used this response 
category more often than expected.   
4 Discussion 
In our study, we focused on the cognitive factors relevant to 
making judgements in data-based decision-making tasks. It 
demonstrates some well-known cognitive limitations in this 
context. The main findings were that 1) the response accuracy in 
data-based decision-making decreases when the amount of 
information increases and 2) noncritical background information 
is used in judgement. These results are in line with the vast 
literature demonstrating the limitations of cognitive capacity 
when the ongoing task requires maintaining and processing 
information in the working memory [6], as well as with research 
demonstrating cognitive biases in decision-making, such as 
judgement being framed by inessential information [2]. The 
contribution of our study is that we demonstrated several kinds 
of cognitive limitations that together constrain the utilisation of 
data. Therefore, when designing human–data interaction, we need 
to draw understanding from several fields of cognition and from 
multiple theoretical frameworks if we wish to compensate for the 
limited human cognitive capacity impairing our ability to 
efficiently utilise data. 
We also need to develop good evidence-based cognitive 
ergonomics principles in design, which improve the quality of 
data-based decisions. These principles should at least (i) support 
the encoding of the reality of the situation by, for example, 
shortening the sequences when presenting information; (ii) 
enhance representation construction if several stages and 
subprocesses are required when presenting the data using, for 
example, a clever sequential presentation system; (iii) support 
ways of communicating which aspects of the data are considered 
meaningful to the user in that context; and (iv) make the human 
decision-maker aware of incidental attributes that may frame 
their decisions and cause them to lean towards unimportant 
aspects of the data. Furthermore, it would be useful to utilise data 
on human behaviour while the user is analysing a data set, in the 
same way as search engines adapt to the user when they navigate 
the internet. For example, identifying ‘outliers’ in response 
patterns in data-usage behaviour would allow the system to 
immediately recognise when the human decision-maker needs 
more support – or when there is a risk of cognitive bias – to 
improve the quality of their decisions.  
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